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ABSTRACT: In this essay I attempt a thorough reconstruction and modification of Roy 
Bhaskar's "transcendental analysis of experimental activity" to show that this analysis contains 
a powerful critique of regularity theories of causal laws and a strong case for a transcendental 
realist, powers-based theory of causal laws.  Despite the short and scattered places in which 
this analysis occurs in Bhaskar's texts, my reconstruction synthesizes these textual resources to 
formulate a unified analysis of experimentation that derives three distinct conclusions from 
four presuppositions and a complex of transcendental arguments.  These conclusions are: 1) 
Extra-experimental reality is, to a significant extent, an open system, 2) Causal laws must be 
distinguished from constant conjunctions of events, and 3) Causal laws are the 
transcendentally real tendencies of generative mechanisms. 
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§1. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most prominent feature of Roy Bhaskar’s early work in the philosophy of 
natural science is the claim that ontology is inexorable, which was advanced in opposition 
to the anti-metaphysical orthodoxy in the philosophy of science established by logical 
positivism.  However, Bhaskar offers two different ways of justifying this claim.  The 
first, which I have written on elsewhere
1
                                                       
1 See §2.2 of Dustin McWherter, The Problem of Critical Ontology: Bhaskar Contra Kant, 1
st ed., Basingbroke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2012. 
, argues that the attempt to avoid ontology 
with a purely epistemological account of science unwittingly generates an implicit 
ontology.  The most frequent target of this argument is the “empirical realist” 
approach to causal laws, which originated in Hume and is represented in the   DUSTIN McWHERTER  200 
philosophy of science by logical positivism and neo-Kantianism.  Bhaskar argues that 
this approach, which seems to circumvent ontology by analysing causal laws as 
regular sequences of perceived events, is actually committed to an ontology, namely, 
one consisting of such events
2
However, whereas the general point of the foregoing argument is that any 
philosophy of science must contain some sort of ontology, Bhaskar’s second way of 
arguing for the inexorability of ontology—which is the focus of this essay—contends 
that a particular ontology is necessary to accommodate scientific experimentation
.  In other words, the anti-ontological philosopher of 
science implicitly presupposes what s/he explicitly denies: ontology. 
3.  
To make this case, Bhaskar offers an analysis which seeks the conditions that make 
the activity of experimentation an intelligible  activity.  Because of its concern with 
conditions of intelligibility and its use of transcendental argumentation to determine 
them, Bhaskar calls this analysis the “transcendental analysis of experimental 
activity”.  The ultimate conclusion of this analysis is that only a non-regularity, 
powers-based theory of causal laws can sustain the intelligibility of experimentation.  
Therefore, this analysis is at the same time a critique of non-powers-based, regularity 
theories of causal laws—i.e., those that, like empirical realism, conceive of causal laws 
in terms of constant conjunctions of events
4
                                                       
2 Cf.: “Now it is clear that any theory of the knowledge of objects entails some theory of the objects of 
knowledge; that every theory of scientific knowledge must logically presuppose a theory of what the 
world is like for knowledge, under the descriptions given it by the theory, to be possible.  Thus, suppose a 
philosopher analyses scientific laws as, or as dependent upon, constant conjunctions of events, he or she is 
then committed to the view that there are such conjunctions” (Roy Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality: A Critical 
Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy (hereafter RR), 1
st ed., London, Verso, 1989, p. 13) and “the general 
line of Hume’s critique of the possibility of any philosophical ontology or account of being, and in 
particular his denial that we can philosophically establish the independent existence of things or 
operation of natural necessities, is accepted.  Now it is important to see what Hume has in fact done.  He 
has not really succeeded in banishing ontology from his account of science.  Rather he has replaced the 
Lockean ontology of real essences, powers and atomic constitutions with his own ontology of impressions. 
(…) The empiricist fills the vacuum he creates with his concept of experience.  In this way an implicit 
ontology, crystallized in the concept of the empirical world, is generated” (Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of 
Science (hereafter RTS), 2
nd ed., London, Verso, 1978, p. 40) 
.  To the extent that the regularity theorist 
concedes the presuppositions of Bhaskar’s analysis (given below in §2), that critique is 
an internal one.  However, Bhaskar does not grant any authority to the Humean 
3 Cf. Roy Bhaskar and Alex Callinicos, “Marxism and Critical Realism: A Debate”, Journal of Critical 
Realism, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2003, p. B99, where Bhaskar (barely) distinguishes these two arguments.  (This text 
is the transcription of a live debate that took place between Bhaskar and Alex Callinicos.  Consequently, 
I have inserted a “B” or “C” before the page number in each citation of this text to indicate that the 
passage represents the words of Bhaskar or Callinicos, respectively.)  Also cf. RTS 39-40. 
4 In this essay I will use “regular sequences of events” and similar phrases synonymously with “constant 
conjunctions of events”.   COSMOS AND HISTORY  201 
sceptical problematization of natural necessity, in which most regularity theories have 
their historical basis.  In fact, one of the upshots of Bhaskar’s analysis is that if 
experimentation is adequately analysed in the first place, such scepticism need never 
arise
5
Hence it could be said that while Bhaskar argues that the empirical realist theory 
of causal laws is indeed ontological, the transcendental analysis of experimental activity 
entails that that theory is also false.  Thus it is important to recognize that, although its 
arguments have a narrower focus, the transcendental analysis of experimental activity 
is the more potent (and more sophisticated) response to the positivist ban on 
metaphysics.  Not only does it seek to refute the empirical realist theory of causal laws 
and justify an ontology of causal powers, but it does so on the basis of presuppositions 
that the empirical realist would accept and with respect to that facet of natural science 
in which sense-experience is so epistemically significant.  In this way the positivist ban 
on metaphysics is shown to collapse in the impossibility of accounting for the 
intelligibility of experimentation without an ontology of causal powers, and the 
validity of a naturalistic metaphysics is secured.  By establishing a general ontology of 
causal powers that does not depend upon any particular scientific theory
. 
6
In this essay I will reconstruct the transcendental analysis of experimental activity 
from the variety of texts and  forms in which it occurs.  I think a rigorous 
reconstruction of Bhaskar’s analysis is very much needed to demonstrate its 
philosophical force, for wariness towards its arguments is a natural consequence of the 
often gnomic and enthymematic character of Bhaskar’s articulation of them.  In the 
secondary literature, both Andrew Collier
, Bhaskar’s 
analysis shows that a philosophical discourse on nature is still possible, while it is the 
positivist project of eliminating the metaphysics of nature that must be deemed 
illegitimate.   
7  and Ruth Groff
8
                                                       
5 Cf. RTS 24 and Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism (hereafter PN), 3
rd ed., Abingdon, Routledge, 
1998, pgs. 9 and 14. 
  have adequately 
conveyed the general thrust of the analysis in their respective works, but I think more 
detail is needed.  As I reconstruct it, the transcendental analysis of experimental 
activity consists of four presuppositions regarding the nature of experimentation (§2) 
and a complex of transcendental arguments toward three distinct conclusions that 
collectively propose the conditions of the intelligibility of experimental activity 
6 See Bhaskar’s distinction between “philosophical” and “scientific” ontologies, e.g., at RTS 29-30. 
7  Andrew Collier, Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy  (hereafter Collier), 1
st  ed., 
London, Verso, 1994. 
8 Ruth Groff, Critical Realism, Post-positivism and the Possibility of Knowledge, 1
st ed., New York, Routledge, 
2007.     DUSTIN McWHERTER  202 
(expounded below in §3).  I should point out that, at least as far as I am aware, the 
exact logical structure of the whole transcendental analysis of experimental activity as 
I present it here is not explicit in any of Bhaskar’s texts or those of his expositors.  
Moreover, in some cases it conflicts with previous presentations and reconstructions, 
particularly at points where I think the formulation of the arguments needs 
improvement.   
For example, at one point Bhaskar mentions two premises for an argument that I 
present in §3 as the argument for the second conclusion of the analysis
9.  
Furthermore, these two premises are basically what I present in §2 as the first two 
presuppositions of the analysis as a whole, with the important difference that in 
Bhaskar’s text they characterize experimentation as an “interference” and 
“disruption” of the course of nature.  At another point, Bhaskar mentions three 
epistemically significant points of interest emphasized by empirical realism (and which 
he subsequently turns against the latter), one of which is the extra-experimental 
application of laws discovered through experimentation
10.  And at yet another point, 
Bhaskar claims, against Alex Callinicos, that in RTS he begins with the widely 
accepted premises of the significance of experimental activity and applied activity and 
that the open/closed system distinction is grounded in the premise that scientists 
“intervene” in the world when experimenting, which premise is supposedly widely 
accepted as well
11
Now it should be clear from my reconstruction of the transcendental analysis of 
experimental activity that I do not fully accept any of these characterizations of that 
analysis’s logical structure.  This is mainly because I do not think there is any need to 
begin with the notions of extra-experimental application or intervention in nature since 
they can be derived in the course of the analysis, properly reconstructed.  (In §3 I will 
.   
                                                       
9 “It should be stressed that the result that there is an ontological distinction between causal laws and 
patterns of events depends upon only two premises: (i) that men are causal agents capable of interfering 
with the course of nature and (ii) that experimental activity, the planned disruption of the course of 
nature, is a significant feature of science” (RTS 54). 
10  “Empirical realists have seized on (1) experimental establishment, (2) knowledge and (3) practical 
application of laws as of prime epistemic significance in science.  For this tradition empirical regularities 
or instrumental successes are at least necessary (transcendental idealism) and perhaps sufficient (classical 
empiricism) conditions for causal laws and other items of general or instrumental, i.e. implicitly general, 
knowledge; and causal laws etc. are analysed as dependent upon, or just as, constant conjunctions of 
events (or states of affairs) perceived or perceptions.  By contrast, for transcendental realism an 
ontological distinction between causal laws and patterns of events is a condition of the intelligibility of (1)-
(3).  If this can be shown, then an immanent refutation of the Humean and Kantian orthodoxies and a 
transcendental revindication of ontology will have been obtained” (Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and 
Human Emancipation (hereafter SRHE), first published by Verso (1986), Abingdon, Routledge, 2009, p. 27). 
11 Bhaskar/Callinicos, “Marxism and Critical Realism: A Debate”, pp. B97-9.     COSMOS AND HISTORY  203 
show how they arise in the complex argument for the third conclusion of Bhaskar’s 
analysis.)  Furthermore, I hope it is also clear that my reconstruction as a whole can 
function as a response to Callinicos’s criticism that Bhaskar’s analysis begins with a 
contentious interpretation of experimentation
12
§2. THE PRESUPPOSITIONS 
.  Again, though, it is easy to see how 
Callinicos and others can get these kinds of impressions, given the nature of Bhaskar’s 
writings, and so it is easy to see why a thorough reconstruction of the analysis’s 
arguments is needed.   
The first presupposition of Bhaskar’s analysis is that experimentation is a significant 
and intelligible feature of natural science.  This claim is rarely contested and so seems 
uncontroversial as a presupposition.  How experiments are significant in science, on 
the other hand, is a more contentious matter of debate which Bhaskar’s analysis 
problematizes and attempts to resolve, as we shall soon see.  The second 
presupposition is that humans (qua scientists) initiate the sequences of events that are 
experienced in an experiment.  For example, when event A is followed by event B in 
an experimental setting, this sequence owes its occurrence in this particular case to 
the involvement of the experimental scientist(s).  In the end, though, this 
presupposition just points out the rather obvious fact that experimental settings are 
constructed and experiments themselves are executed, such that the generation of the 
conjunctions of events to which experiments afford experiential access are due to this 
construction and execution by humans
13
                                                       
12 “Bhaskar (…) seeks to establish an account of the structure of the world based on an interpretation, not 
(explicitly, at least) of the content of scientific theories, but on an interpretation of scientists’ practice: thus 
his transcendental argument moves from the claim that scientific experimentation involves the creation 
of ‘closed systems’ in which events form a uniform sequence to the inference that the mechanisms that 
are thereby revealed exist independently of human activity and, further, that, in their ‘natural’ state, they 
form, with other mechanisms, an ‘open system’ where the result of their interactions produce perceptible 
effects very different from those isolated in experiment. (…) The difficulty with this is that the starting 
point of this argument is precisely an interpretation of what scientists do: it is open to others to contest this 
account of scientific practice and to offer their own rival interpretations.  It would seem better to strip 
away the transcendental superstructure that obscures what is interesting and original in Bhaskar’s work 
and offer it simply as a philosophical presentation of the world as revealed to us by the sciences.” (Alex 
Callinicos, The Resources of Critique, 1
st ed., Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006, p. 159); “without the distraction 
offered by Bhaskar’s account of scientific practice (which arguably presupposes the distinction that he is 
seeking to establish), we can directly consider the strengths and weaknesses of his ontology compared to 
those offered by others” (ibid 160).  Cf. Bhaskar/Callinicos, “Marxism and Critical Realism”, pp. C92-3. 
.  This too seems an uncontroversial 
presupposition.  The third presupposition of Bhaskar’s analysis is that constant 
13 What I am here calling the “construction” and “execution” of an experiment is basically what Bhaskar 
eventually dubs “experimental control” and “experimental production”.  See RTS 53 and 256.   DUSTIN McWHERTER  204 
conjunctions of events prevail (or at least can prevail) in experiments.  (Incidentally, 
this is what makes experimental settings, by definition, “closed systems”, in Bhaskar’s 
terminology, for this term should initially be understood to denote just any domain 
wherein constant conjunctions abound
14.)  The constancy  of conjunctions in 
experimental settings is perhaps just an index of the repeatability  of experiments
15
It is worthwhile to keep these assumptions in mind in what follows, for insofar as 
they are presuppositions of the transcendental analysis of experimental activity one 
can refuse to grant any or all of them and be free from the conclusions of the analysis.  
And if the analysis is sound one must reject them to be free from the conclusions
, 
which itself perhaps follows from the constructed character of experiments.  Finally, 
the fourth presupposition of Bhaskar’s analysis is that the constant conjunctions of 
events exhibited in experiments in some way afford epistemic access to causal laws, 
however the latter may subsequently be conceived.   
16
§3. THE ARGUMENTS 
.  
Consequently, posing a substantive challenge in that case would require explaining 
how experiments are not intelligible or significant in science, how experimental 
sequences do not require human activity, how experiments do not exhibit regularities 
of sequences, and/or how the regularities of sequences exhibited in experiments have 
no bearing on our knowledge of causal laws.  Such explanations cannot be ruled out a 
priori, of course (and they may or may not have their own presuppositions that shift 
the burden up a level), but I will say nothing more about them here.  Any remaining 
disputes will have to concern the analysis itself, to which I will now turn.  In each of 
three cases, I will first state a conclusion of the analysis, thoroughly explicate it so that 
what is being argued for is clear, and then proceed to the argument(s) for that 
conclusion. 
Given the foregoing presuppositions, Bhaskar contends that the conditions of the 
intelligibility of experimental activity are the following.   
 
1. Extra-experimental reality is, to a significant extent, an open system.  This claim should be 
interpreted quite parsimoniously at first.  That is, at this point in the argument, 
                                                       
14 Cf. ibid 70 and SRHE 27.  The reason why I say this term should be “initially” understood in this way 
is that the notion of a “closure”, and what it means to construct a closed system, will eventually take on 
greater significance, and will be shown to be enriched in the course of  Bhaskar’s analysis, not at the 
beginning of it. 
15 Cf. Collier 33-4. 
16 Cf. RTS 260 and Bhaskar/Callinicos, “Marxism and Critical Realism”, pgs. B97 and B98.   COSMOS AND HISTORY  205 
“extra-experimental reality” should be understood just as the domain of that which is 
outside experimental settings and which we experience as such.  Furthermore, by 
“open system” Bhaskar just means any domain wherein “no constant conjunction or 
regular sequence of events is forthcoming” (RTS 33)
17
Now, the reason why the open-systematic character of extra-experimental reality 
is a condition for the intelligibility of experimental activity is that there would be no 
reason to construct the settings for an experiment and repeatedly initiate sequences of 
events if those same sequences could be consistently registered without experiments—
i.e., if extra-experimental reality  exhibited relatively abundant regularities of 
sequences.  In other words, the experimental initiation of a sequence A-B would be 
redundant if A were always followed by B (rather than A-C, A-D, C-B, etc. sometimes 
occurring) outside experimental settings.  Consequently, if the initiation of constant 
conjunctions of events in experimental settings is not an exercise in superfluity, then it 
must give us something that we did not already have.  Bhaskar complains that “The weakness 
of previous analyses of experimental activity is that they have not appreciated the 
significance of the fact that conjunctions of phenomena have to be worked for 
practically” (RTS 54).  To begin to understand that significance, we must ask why 
those conjunctions are worked for practically in experiments rather than just passively 
observed.  The answer, again, is that extra-experimental reality, whatever else it may 
be, cannot be relied upon to regularly display the sequences of events scientists 
produce in experimental settings
.  Therefore, to say that extra-
experimental reality is, to a significant extent, an open system is just to say that 
constant conjunctions or regular sequences of events do not, to a significant extent, 
prevail outside experimental settings.  Any further characteristics that may pertain to 
extra-experimental reality—e.g., whether it exists independently of our experience of 
it or not, whether it is undifferentiated, structured, or whatever—are not yet at issue 
here and so remain (as of now) undetermined.   
18
                                                       
17  Basically the same is said at RTS 13, PN 9, SRHE 27, and RR 16.  Cf.: “in open systems the 
instantiation of the antecedent of a lawish statement is by definition not invariably accompanied by the 
realisation of the consequent” (SRHE 28) and “the criterion of open-ness is the non-invariance of 
empirical relationships” (RTS 132). 
.  And to say that extra-experimental reality cannot 
be counted on to exhibit the constant conjunctions of events that experiments do is 
just to say that extra-experimental reality is to a considerable degree an open system.  
Any conclusion to the contrary makes the experimental initiation of sequences of 
events a dispensable and arbitrary facet of natural science.  If we could just passively 
observe constant conjunctions outside experimental settings we would not need to 
initiate them within experimental settings, and so the fact that we do initiate them in 
18 Cf. RTS 33 and 53, SRHE 27 and 28, RR 51, Collier 47, and Groff, Critical Realism, etc., p. 33.   DUSTIN McWHERTER  206 
experiments entails that we do not normally observe (or otherwise access) them 
without experiments if that initiation is to be explicable.  Thus the “significant extent” 
to which extra-experimental reality is an open system is commensurate with the 
extent to which experimental activity is non-redundant.  In short, “It is (...) the 
ubiquity of open systems in nature
19
Furthermore, if the intelligibility of experimental activity requires that the 
constant conjunctions of events initiated in experiments are not arbitrary replicas of 
extra-experimental reality, then, by the same token, they should not be arbitrary 
departures from  it either.  In other words, the question as to why constant 
conjunctions of events have to be initiated in experiments rather than passively 
observed in extra-experimental reality points to the larger question of why and how 
such constant conjunctions are significant at all.  Extra-experimental reality being an 
open system may condition the intelligibility of the experimental initiation of regular 
sequences of events, but this cannot alone condition the intelligibility of the sequences 
themselves.  This leads to the second conclusion of Bhaskar’s analysis: 
 that makes necessary an experimental rather than 
a merely empirical science” (ibid 91).   
 
2. Causal laws must be distinguished from constant conjunctions of events.  That is, causal laws 
cannot consist in (necessarily or contingently) invariant relations between events.  
Bhaskar, like the empirical realist, maintains that the significance of the constant 
conjunctions of events in experiments is that they afford epistemic access to causal 
laws.  However, unlike the empirical realist, Bhaskar contends that these empirical 
grounds  for our knowledge of causal laws must be distinguished from causal laws 
themselves.  It should be noted that this conclusion makes a negative claim about 
causal laws since it only states what causal laws are not, and it is complemented by a 
further conclusion that makes a positive claim about what causal laws are instead (the 
third conclusion of Bhaskar’s analysis as I am reconstructing it).  I will first present the 
argument for the second/negative conclusion and then proceed to the third/positive 
conclusion and its supporting argument, but here I just want to flag in advance the 
fact that the positive conclusion does much of the work of the negative conclusion 
insofar as that which the former identifies with causal laws is not regular sequences of 
events, such that an analytic consequence of the positive conclusion is that causal laws 
are not regular sequences of events (i.e., the negative conclusion).  Nevertheless, the 
respective arguments toward these two conclusions are distinct, and the argument for 
the negative conclusion is not superfluous insofar as it adds to the case against 
regularity theories of causal laws. 
                                                       
19 I.e., extra-experimental reality.   COSMOS AND HISTORY  207 
  To proceed to that argument, the reason why causal laws cannot consist in 
regular sequences of events is that if that were the case the experimental initiation of 
such a sequence would take on an ontogenetic function that nullifies the sequence’s 
epistemic significance.  For example, in being responsible for the occurrence (and 
reoccurrence) of the sequence A-B in experimental settings, the experimental scientist 
would be responsible for the existence of a causal law: e.g., either the law that A has 
always been followed by B or the law that if A occurs B necessarily follows.  In that 
case, an experiment would not just discover causal laws, it would actually generate them, 
for if causal laws consist in regular sequences of events, and scientists are capable of 
initiating the latter in experiments, then it would follow that scientists are capable of 
generating causal laws: “Notice that as human activity is in general necessary for 
constant conjunctions, if one identifies causal laws with them then one is logically 
committed to the absurdity that human beings, in their experimental activity, cause 
and even change the laws of nature!” (PN 9)
20
The only way to avoid these consequences, Bhaskar insists, is to distinguish causal 
laws and constant conjunctions of events
.  This would endow scientists with a 
considerable power to determine what causal laws exist, but the real problem is that 
this would be a power whose exercise would be arbitrary and unconstrained enough 
to make it epistemically worthless.  That is, if scientists produced causal laws when 
initiating sequences of events, there would be no (epistemic) reason for them to initiate a 
regular sequence rather than not.  Why must they do so?  Just as the ubiquity of constant 
conjunctions of events in extra-experimental reality would render the same ubiquity 
produced in experimental settings redundant, so the assimilation of causal laws to 
constant conjunctions of events would render the experimental initiation of the latter 
groundless.  The interrogatory dimension of experimentation would be lost, because 
experiments would not be inquiries into causal laws but rather productions of them.   
21
                                                       
20 Much the same is said at RR 15-6.   
.  In their initiation of regular sequences of 
events, scientists are responsible for the occurrence of something that allows causal 
laws to be known but which, for that very reason, cannot be the laws themselves: 
“what scientists produce in laboratories are not the laws of nature, but their empirical 
grounds; and it is upon the elision of the ontological distinction between them that the 
empirical realist account tacitly depends” (SRHE 28, emphasis added).  This 
distinction is “ontological” because it concerns what constant conjunctions of events 
and causal laws are  (and are not), and by differentiating causal laws from their 
empirical grounds it entails that the ontological (causal laws) cannot be reduced to or 
conflated with the epistemological (empirical grounds). 
21 Cf. ibid 39-40, RTS 12, 33 and 54, and Groff, Critical Realism, etc., p. 33.   DUSTIN McWHERTER  208 
For additional support of this negative conclusion Bhaskar notes some further 
consequences that follow from the identification of causal laws and constant 
conjunctions of events.  These concern the disruption of sequences of events in extra-
experimental reality and human  error in the construction and execution of 
experiments.  The basic point is that if causal laws consist in regular sequences of 
events, then these situations would entail the extreme fragility, or even the outright 
nonexistence, of many causal laws—consequences which regularity theorists would 
presumably want to resist.  To use Bhaskar’s examples, we would not suppose that 
Newton’s laws of motion—which, together with his law of universal gravitation, 
explain how the planetary bodies maintain their regular orbital patterns—would be 
defied  if a nuclear explosion destroyed Earth, thereby terminating its regular orbit 
around the sun.  Similarly, we would not suppose that Einstein’s theory of relativity—
which accounts for the precession of Mercury’s orbital pattern—would be falsified if 
something interfered with Mercury’s perihelion
22.  However, what the above 
examples allow us to see is that if these Newtonian and Einsteinian laws ultimately 
consist in regular sequences of events then they would be violated or the theories that 
describe them would be refuted in these counterfactual situations, because the latter 
exhibit serious disruptions in the regularities of the solar system.  Such consequences 
can be avoided if causal laws are distinguished from constant conjunctions of events.  
Furthermore, Bhaskar argues, any “reasonably intelligent schoolboy or moderately 
clumsy research worker” (RTS 34) can easily interfere with the execution of the most 
carefully constructed experiment to a degree that affects the sequence of events the 
experiment yields
23
                                                       
22 RTS 34. 
, but we would not thereby suppose that such a person “has the 
power to overturn the laws of nature” (ibid, emphasis added).  To take another example 
from Bhaskar, one can easily influence sequences of events in experiments that are 
constructed to test Coulomb’s law, which describes the electrostatic force that 
electrically charged particles exert on each other over a given distance.  One can 
interfere with the operation of the torsion balance in various ways, e.g., by damaging 
or restricting the motion of the twisting fibre, or by entering the space between the 
two electrically charged bodies.  In that case, however, we would not suppose that the 
meddlesome experimenter has the ability to upset the law itself, but that would seem to 
be the implication if causal laws consist in the regular sequences of events that 
experiments exhibit.   
23 At ibid 34n14 Bhaskar cites J. R. Ravetz’s “4
th law of thermodynamics”: “no experiment goes properly 
the first time”.   COSMOS AND HISTORY  209 
Furthermore, Bhaskar argues that similar difficulties arise if one who supports a 
regularity theory of causal laws maintains that science actually has discovered causal 
laws, because the fact of irregularities in extra-experimental reality coupled with an 
identification of causal laws with regular sequences of events results in a considerable 
impediment to the ubiquity or even the existence of causal laws in extra-experimental 
reality and/or our knowledge of them.  In other words, if there is a considerable 
amount of irregular sequences of events in extra-experimental reality, as the above 
argument for the first conclusion of Bhaskar’s analysis says there is, then one who 
identifies causal laws with regular sequences of events must either deny lawfulness to 
extra-experimental reality or maintain that science has discovered little if any causal 
laws that are operative in extra-experimental reality
24.  As Alan Chalmers says, “If the 
view that laws describe exceptionless regular connections between events is taken 
seriously, then none of the claims typically taken to be scientific laws would qualify”
25.  
Chalmers takes as an example Galileo’s law of fall, which states that bodies, regardless 
of their weight, drop through the same distance with a uniform acceleration that is 
proportional to the time of the fall (and which Galileo supposedly
26 experimentally 
established with metallic spheres rolled down an inclined plane).  As Chalmers points 
out, the regularity theory of causal laws would entail the falsity of Galileo’s law, for 
autumn leaves hardly ever fall to the ground with the uniform velocity that Galileo’s 
law says all bodies do
27
In short, if irregularities in extra-experimental reality—which, remember, will be 
frequent since the latter is largely an open system—do not constitute breaches of 
causal laws or refutations of theories that posit such laws, and experimental accidents 
do not exemplify human physical activity’s dominion over natural law, then causal 
laws must be something other than regular sequences of events.  Therefore, if the 
ubiquity or even the existence of causal laws in extra-experimental reality is to be 
preserved, such laws must be distinguished from the regularities in experiments that 
are their empirical grounds.  As George Molnar aptly summarizes the matter, 
“Regularity may be a significant guide in the search for causes, but it is not 
constitutive of causation.  Hume’s great idea was born from, and in turn reinforced, a 
.   
                                                       
24 Cf. PN 10, RR 16, and SRHE 28-9. 
25 A.F. Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science?, 3
rd ed., Maidenhead, Open University Press, 1999, p. 
215.  In Chalmers’s vocabulary, “causal laws” are opposed to “regularities” since the former term is 
reserved for laws that are based in causal powers and the latter term refers to relations between events 
that have no such basis, whereas I am construing regularity theories of laws as theories of causal laws (i.e., 
ones that do not posit real causal powers at the basis of laws). 
26 See ibid 99 and 152-3. 
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tangled mixture of epistemology and metaphysics that we are still trying to unravel to 
this day”
28
So far my reconstruction of Bhaskar’s analysis has argued that causal laws are not 
regular sequences of events, but it remains to be seen what they are instead.  It has 
also been argued that a regularity theory of causal laws cannot manage the largely 
open-systematic character of extra-experimental reality or account for the epistemic 
significance of constant conjunctions of events in experiments, but it remains to be 
seen what theory of causal laws can.  The latter question is dealt with in the argument 
toward the third conclusion of Bhaskar’s analysis, and the former question is answered 
in the conclusion itself: 
. 
 
3. Causal laws are the transcendentally real tendencies of generative mechanisms.  To say that 
causal laws are “transcendentally real” is to say that they exist independently from the 
conceptual (e.g, theories, concepts, and propositions), perceptual (e.g., observation of 
experimental and extra-experimental reality), and practical/material (e.g., 
construction and execution of experiments and technological augmentation of 
perception) conditions that enable them to be identified by humans
29.  This is the 
central claim of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism, “which may be defined as the thesis 
that the objects and relations of which knowledge is obtained in the social activity of 
science both exist and act independently of human beings (and hence of human sense-
experience)” (RR 197n80)
30
We can easily imagine a world similar to ours, containing the same intransitive 
objects of scientific knowledge, but without any science to produce knowledge of 
them.  In such a world, which has occurred and may come again, reality would 
be unspoken for and yet things would not cease to act and interact in all kinds of 
ways.  In such a world the causal laws that science has now, as a matter of fact, 
discovered would presumably still prevail, and the kinds of things that science 
has identified endure.  The tides would still turn and metals conduct electricity 
in the way that they do, without a Newton or a Drude to produce our 
knowledge of them.  The Wiedemann-Franz law would continue to hold 
although there would be no-one to formulate, experimentally establish or 
deduce it.  Two atoms of hydrogen would continue to combine with one atom of 
oxygen and in favourable circumstances osmosis would continue to occur.  In 
.  Hence Bhaskar’s use of counterfactuals to illustrate the 
kind of scientific realism his position entails: 
                                                       
28 George Molnar, Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, 1
st ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 188.  
Cf. RTS 140. 
29 Cf. ibid 186, SRHE 47, RR 17 and 149, and Roy Bhaskar, Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom (hereafter 
PIF), 1
st ed., Oxford, Blackwell, 1991, p. 8. 
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short, the intransitive objects of knowledge are in general invariant to our 
knowledge of them
31: they are the real things and structures, mechanisms and 
processes, events and possibilities of the world; and for the most part they are 
quite independent of us.  They are not unknowable, because as a matter of fact 
quite a bit is known about them.  (Remember they were introduced as objects of 
scientific knowledge.)  But neither are they in any way dependent upon our 
knowledge, let alone perception, of them.  They are the intransitive, science-
independent, objects of scientific discovery and investigation. (RTS 22)
32
Now, what does it mean to say that causal laws are the “tendencies” of 
“generative mechanisms”?  Let us take generative mechanisms first.  According to 
Bhaskar, “There is nothing esoteric or mysterious about the concept of the generative 
mechanisms of nature, which provide the real basis of causal laws.  For a generative 
mechanism is nothing other than a way of acting  of a thing” (RTS 51, emphasis 
added)
 
33.  As straightforward as this characterization is, further explication of this 
concept of a “way of acting” is possible and useful.  As a way of acting, a particular 
generative mechanism is responsible for a particular kind of action which can in turn 
have a particular kind of effect if that action is unimpeded.  In other words, when 
something acts (unimpeded) something else happens, and that something else is an event 
generated by the action
34
                                                       
31 This is precisely what makes them “intransitive”.  Cf. RTS 21-2 for Bhaskar’s introduction of the 
transitive/intransitive distinction.  For the purposes of the present essay at least, it would suffice to say 
that “intransitive” is tantamount to “transcendentally real”. 
.  Hence the way something acts is essentially linked to what 
something can do.  Crucially, though, a way of acting can be ascribed to a thing that does 
not  always  act in that way, because what something can do is distinct from what 
something will do, is doing, or has done.  For example, considering Galileo’s law of fall 
again, bodies fall to the ground with uniform acceleration in the same amount of 
time.  This is a way they can act, and the way specific ones (metallic spheres) did act 
when rolling down Galileo’s inclined planes.  And so the generative mechanism in this 
case would be the property of bodies that enables them to fall with uniform 
acceleration in the same amount of time, namely, their susceptibility to another 
generative mechanism: the earth’s gravitational pull.  However, they need not 
continue to act this way for this way of acting to be attributed to them, and thus for 
the law to apply to them.  This is because the law of fall fundamentally concerns what 
they can do, and will do under certain circumstances, but not necessarily what they 
always do (though there may be mechanisms that are always active).   
32 Cf. ibid 27 and 47-8. 
33 Much the same is said at ibid 14. 
34 Cf. PIF 7 and Collier 43.   DUSTIN McWHERTER  212 
Consequently, a generative mechanism can also be characterized as a power, for a 
power is something that can be possessed without being exercised
35.  As Collier says, “To 
say that there are unexercised powers is only to say that ‘can’ does not equal ‘does’” 
(Collier 9).  More specifically, a generative mechanism can be characterized as a 
power (hence “mechanism”) to produce (hence “generative”) certain effects and thus 
as a causal power: “reference to causal laws involves centrally reference to causal agents; 
that is, to things endowed with causal powers.  On this interpretation then the 
generative mechanisms of nature exist as the causal powers of things” (RTS 49-50)
36.  
It is for this reason that Bhaskar also describes a generative mechanism as “a ‘real 
something’ over and above and independent of patterns of events” (ibid 49), for it is 
responsible for the generation of certain events yet irreducible to them.  (Furthermore, 
I should note that, as some of the passages quoted above show, Bhaskar often says 
generative mechanisms are “of things”, but whether generative mechanisms “inhere 
in” things distinct from them as their properties or are somewhat “ontologically 
autonomous”, so to speak, is not, as far as I can tell, decided by the transcendental 
analysis of experimental activity, which is probably a virtue since contemporary 
physics arguably shows both cases to pertain
37.  Accordingly, my exposition of this 
part of Bhaskar’s analysis is intended to be abstract enough to allow both cases and 
will not offer any detailed discussion of the concept of a “thing” for that reason
38
                                                       
35 Cf.: “‘Power’ is a non-technical term, designating what something can do” (Collier 62). 
.) 
36 Cf.: “Bhaskar’s contention is that laws do not refer to such sequences at all, but rather to underlying 
causal mechanisms—that is, to the powers of real entities to effect change” (Groff, Critical Realism, etc., pp. 34-5, 
emphasis added), “A mechanism in this sense is not necessarily mechanical in the sense of Newtonian 
mechanics.  It could be an animal instinct, an economic tendency, a syntactic structure, a Freudian 
‘defence-mechanism’” (Collier 43), and “A generative mechanism, we might say, is that aspect of the 
structure of a thing by virtue of which it has a certain power.  For example, that aspect of the structure of 
an oxygen atom by virtue of which it can combine with two hydrogen atoms to form a molecule of water; 
that aspect of a DNA molecule by virtue of which it can replicate itself; that aspect of a market economy 
by virtue of which it can go into an overproduction crisis; that aspect of a person’s brain-structure by 
virtue of which he or she can acquire language” (ibid 62). 
37 Cf. Bhaskar’s remarks at RTS 180 regarding those moments in scientific discovery when it is not clear 
whether a causal power has a non-power ontological base or not.  Also see Molnar, Powers, pp. 125-42 for 
a defence (completely independent from Bhaskar’s work) of the metaphysical possibility of “ungrounded 
powers” on the basis of the (actual) a posteriori discovery and (at least apparent) nature of subatomic 
particles. 
38 One noteworthy facet of Bhaskar’s conception of things is that it cannot be assimilated to the common 
sense conception: “Now the things posited by science in its investigations may be quite recondite and 
abstract with respect to our ordinary experience.  It is wrong to think of them as necessarily like material 
objects—they may be powers, forces, fields, or just complex structures or sets of relationships.  Their 
metaphysical character, which justifies us labelling them as ‘things’ to mark their insusceptibility to 
analysis as ‘events’ or ‘experiences’, lies in their persistence and transfactual activity” (RTS 226); “The   COSMOS AND HISTORY  213 
Finally, we are now in a position to understand Bhaskar’s conception of a 
tendency.  First, to say that causal laws are the tendencies of generative mechanisms is 
not to say that causal laws (as tendencies) are “properties” or “attributes” of 
generative mechanisms, which are their “bearers” (in the way that generative 
mechanisms might be properties of things, for example).  Rather, it is to say that 
causal laws consist in generative mechanisms qualified in a certain manner.  The concept 
of a tendency is a modification of the concept of a generative mechanism.  With the 
concept of a generative mechanism or a causal power we understand something that 
can be exercised or manifest but can just as well exist unexercised or unmanifest.  
With the concept of a tendency, however, Bhaskar intends to re-describe generative 
mechanisms in a manner that highlights the additional possibility of their exercise 
being unfulfilled (usually owing to the influence of countervailing factors)
39: “whereas 
powers are potentialities which may or may not be exercised, tendencies are 
potentialities which may be exercised or as it were ‘in play’ without being realized or 
manifest in any particular outcome” (RTS 50)
40.  In short, the notion of a tendency is 
intended to designate a generative mechanism that not only actualizes a certain effect 
or manifests itself in a certain way but can also be exercised without its effect being 
actualized and be real without being exercised at all: “Tendencies may be possessed 
unexercised, exercised unrealized, and realized unperceived (or undetected) by men” 
(ibid 184)
41
As Bhaskar notes, it may feel strange to ascribe a tendency to a physical thing, 
whereas in the case of human behaviour the notion of a tendency is quite clear
.   
42.  For 
example, a kleptomaniac has the tendency to steal whether or not s/he is actually 
stealing something, and that tendency is exercised unfulfilled when s/he is arrested for 
attempted shoplifting
43
                                                                                                                                           
class of ‘things’ is far wider than that of ‘material objects’: it includes fluids, gases, electronic structures, 
fields of potentials, genetic codes, etc.; so we must try to divest the concept of its normal material object 
connotations” (ibid 98-9). 
.  A moment’s consideration will show, though, that it is not 
difficult to conceive of non-human phenomena in terms of tendencies.  Galileo’s law 
39 Cf. Collier 63.  In the Appendix to chapter 3 of RTS Bhaskar introduces further specifications of the 
concept of tendency, leading to  a distinction between “tendency1” and “tendency2”.  However, see 
Collier 124-5 for what I think is a convincing critique of Bhaskar on this point, which argues that the 
proposed distinction does not hold up. 
40 This passage may give the misleading impression that tendencies should be distinguished from powers 
when it is actually extending the concept of powers.  Cf.: “Tendencies may be regarded as powers or 
liabilities of a thing which may be exercised without being manifest in any particular outcome” (RTS 14) 
and the passage from ibid 184 quoted below. 
41 Cf. ibid 18, 50, and 229, PN 9, SRHE 34, RR 16, and Collier 37.   
42 RTS 99. 
43 Cf. ibid 232-3 and Collier 37.   DUSTIN McWHERTER  214 
of fall will help us once again.  Bodies have the tendency to fall to the earth with 
uniform velocity.  This tendency is exercised and fulfilled in metallic spheres on 
Galileo’s inclined planes; it is exercised unfulfilled in autumn leaves that fall to the 
ground irregularly due to the disturbing influences of air-resistance and winds; it is 
possessed unexercised when such objects are not falling at all (and hence the enabling 
conditions of the tendency’s exercise are not present)
44
Now to the argument for the third conclusion of Bhaskar’s analysis, which is 
complex and draws on the arguments for the previous two conclusions.  Firstly, the 
fact that the experimental initiation of constant conjunctions of events gives us 
something that extra-experimental reality does not (argument for the first conclusion), 
and does so for an epistemic reason (fourth presupposition), entails that those constant 
conjunctions of events be significant with regard to extra-experimental reality.  In other words, 
given that passive observation of extra-experimental reality alone is insufficient to 
empirically identify causal laws while the regular sequences of events in experiments 
are initiated in response to this insufficiency but are not causal laws themselves (this 
follows from the arguments for the first and second conclusions taken together), the 
epistemic value of experiments must extend beyond experimental settings.  Whatever of 
significance we gain from experiments must be in some way applicable  to extra-
experimental reality if experimental activity is to be intelligible, for experiments are 
obviously only pursued because we cannot get by without them, and the fact that we 
cannot get by without them already implies that they have some relation to what is by 
definition outside them: extra-experimental reality.  They are constructed in response 
to circumstances that exceed them, and this, along with the fact that experimental 
sequences constitute only the empirical grounds for causal laws, entails that the 
relation between experiments and extra-experimental reality is of epistemic import
.   
45
                                                       
44 Cf. Chalmers, What is this Thing Called Science?, pgs. 216 and 218.  Also cf.: “It is not true of every water-
soluble thing that it dissolves when immersed in water, it is not true of every fragile thing that it breaks on 
being lightly knocked, etc.” (Molnar, Powers, p. 87). 
.  
Furthermore, if this were not the case, experiments would be so insular  as to be 
epistemically worthless, for—unless we allow experimental settings to exhaust our 
conception of nature (and if we did we would then have to explain, or explain away, 
extra-experimental reality)—experiments could not allow us access to laws of nature if 
they did not resonate into extra-experimental reality.  Therefore, it is a condition of 
the intelligibility of experimental activity that experimental results be applicable to 
extra-experimental reality, for an experiment “is epistemically significant to the extent 
that the causal law it enables us to identify and test holds outside and independently of 
45 Cf. Groff, Critical Realism, etc., p. 12 and Collier 34-5.   COSMOS AND HISTORY  215 
the experiment” (SRHE 28)
46.  (Notice that if the extra-experimental applicability of 
experimental results is taken as a premise, an alternative argument for the second 
conclusion of Bhaskar’s analysis can be derived, as Groff and Bhaskar have shown
47
Secondly, there must be some common basis for causal laws  between experimental 
sequences and extra-experimental reality that provides the link between experimental 
sequences and extra-experimental reality, thereby enabling the application of the 
former, as the empirical grounds for causal laws, to the latter.  Furthermore, since 
extra-experimental reality is to a significant extent an open system while an 
(adequately constructed) experimental setting is not, the link between them must be 
based in something that is distinct from, yet compatible with, regular and irregular 
sequences of events.  In other words, it must allow causal laws to obtain in closed and 
open systems alike since it conditions the link between them.  Consequently, it cannot 
be limited to regular sequences of events, since this would forbid application to the 
open-systematic facets of extra-experimental reality, or irregular sequences of events, 
since this would exclude experimental results.  Crucially, though, it must equally be 
distinct from sequences of events tout court if the epistemic significance of the extra-
experimental application of experimental results is to be sustained.  That is, it cannot 
consist in something like “sequentiality itself” or “relations between events in general” 
either.  Even though the latter would be general enough to encompass regular and 
irregular sequences of events, it can only do so at the cost of depriving experimental 
sequences of a rationale.  If bare sequentiality were the common basis for causal laws 
between experiments and extra-experimental reality, then an experiment’s regular 
sequence of events would not give us anything more in the way of causal laws than passive 
observation of open-systematic phenomena in extra-experimental reality would.  This 
is because the latter’s irregular sequences of events instantiate bare sequentiality just 
as well as an adequately constructed experiment’s regular sequences of events does, 
.) 
                                                       
46 Cf. RTS 33.   
47 “This belief, however—that experiments can tell us something about what the world is like outside the 
experimental setting—presupposes that while scientists do (and in general must) actively induce 
regularities, they do not thereby produce the causes of such regularities.  If such a presupposition were not 
in place, and instead experimenters were thought to produce not just regular conjunctions but the laws 
governing such conjunctions, then such laws could not be expected to hold outside experimental 
settings.” (Groff, Critical Realism, etc., p. 12) and “A sequence of events can only function as a criterion for 
a law if the latter is ontologically irreducible to the former. (...) But it can now be seen that not only the 
experimental establishment but the  practical application of our knowledge depends upon this same 
ontological distinction.  For unless causal laws persisted and operated outside the context of their closure, 
i.e. where no constant conjunctions of events obtained, science could not be used in the explanation, 
prediction, construction and diagnosis of the phenomena of ordinary life” (RTS 65).  Cf. ibid 34 and 
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for they are both (obviously) sequences of events.  In other words, bare sequentiality 
would be too general to accommodate extra-experimental application: experimental 
results could not be applied in an epistemically significant way because they would be 
superfluous in the first place.  Therefore, whatever it is about the basis for causal laws 
that enables extra-experimental application must be compatible with yet irreducible 
to relations between events tout court.   
Bhaskar argues that there is only one remaining option: that there must be “a ‘real 
something’ over and above and independent of patterns of events; and it is for the status of this 
real something that the concept of a generative mechanism  is groomed” (RTS 49, 
emphasis added).  A generative mechanism is compatible with yet irreducible to 
sequences of events, for, as we have already seen, it is a power to produce an effect and 
generate a sequence of events.  As such, it is in principle distinct from the sequences of 
events that occur upon actual productions of that effect, and since it can exist without 
being exercised it is independent from those sequences (in the sense that its existence 
does not depend upon them).  As Bhaskar points out, once it is allowed that 
generative mechanisms are real, it is possible to provide an account of causal laws that 
does not depend upon regular sequences of events, for the independence of causal 
laws from regular sequences of events will have its foundation in the independence of 
generative mechanisms from the sequences of events they produce
48
At this point in Bhaskar’s analysis, we can see that its conception of nature qua 
extra-experimental reality has been significantly enriched.  Extra-experimental reality 
can now be seen to include a multiplicity of generative mechanisms that interact with 
each other in ways that determine whether or not some or other generative 
mechanism will bring about its characteristic effect (e.g., the conditions that would 
enable the operation of a generative mechanism may not be present, a generative 
mechanism may operate and be counteracted or somehow influenced by a more 
.  Furthermore, 
generative mechanisms are equally compatible with regular and irregular sequences 
of events (which is to say that they are equally compatible with open and closed 
systems).  This is because a generative mechanism, as a distinctive causal power to 
produce a distinctive effect, can operate with uniform consequences if its activity is 
unimpeded, and it can operate with variable consequences if its activity is impeded by other 
generative mechanisms.  Consequently, the existence of generative mechanisms allows us 
to further explain why  experimental settings constitute closed systems and extra-
experimental reality is largely an open system: in experimental settings generative 
mechanisms operate uninhibited, and in extra-experimental reality their activity can 
be offset by the activity of other generative mechanisms.   
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powerful one, or it may operate uninhibited and bring about its characteristic effect)
49.  
Thus Collier notes that one consequence of Bhaskar’s analysis is that there must be a 
multiplicity of generative mechanisms in extra-experimental reality, for if there were 
only one generative mechanism there would be a naturally closed system and 
therefore no need to initiate regular sequences of events in experiments to gain 
epistemic access to causal laws
50
Most importantly, though, generative mechanisms being the common basis for 
causal laws between experiments and extra-experimental reality can ground the 
epistemic significance of experimental results and their extra-experimental 
application.  That is, according to Bhaskar’s analysis, the purpose of initiating 
constant conjunctions of events in experiments is to study the unimpeded activity of a 
generative mechanism, and this cannot be achieved without experiments to the extent 
that the activity of a generative mechanism would otherwise be impeded by the 
activity of other generative mechanisms or held in abeyance by the absence of 
enabling conditions.  This also explains why experimental scientists need to initiate 
regular sequences of events—that is, why experiments need to be repeatable, and why 
experimental settings need to be closed systems—for if the purpose of experiments is to 
study the unimpeded activity of a generative mechanism, then scientists need to ensure 
that that activity truly is unimpeded and that the experimental sequences of events 
obtained are characteristic of the particular generative mechanism under study rather 
than others
.   
51
This epistemic need to construct closed systems also reveals the sense in which 
experiments are interventions  in the course of natural events.  Other generative 
mechanisms have to be excluded from experimental settings and prevented from 
influencing the ensuing sequences of events that the experimenter(s) initiate.  What 
this means is that scientists, to a significant extent—which is, again, the extent to 
which experimental activity is intelligible—have to intervene in the course of natural 
events because the objects of knowledge they seek (in this case, causal laws) are not 
.   
                                                       
49 Cf. Callinicos, The Resources of Critique, pp. 161-2. 
50 Collier 45-6. 
51  Cf. Callinicos, The Resources of Critique,  p. 162, RTS 134, and Collier 33-4.  Also cf. Collier’s 
qualifications: “What the experiment does, in short, is to isolate one mechanism of nature from the 
effects of others, to see what that mechanism does on its own.  Of course, that mechanism is not literally 
‘isolated’.  There cannot be needles or magnetic fields without a lot of other things as well.  But we can 
know (fallibly, of course, like all knowledge) that other mechanisms are not interfering; we can neutralize 
the effect of other mechanisms, either by the way the experiment is set up (…) or, where a known 
mechanism other than the one to be tested is unavoidably present, we may be able to determine in what 
way and how much it is affecting the outcome, and make allowances” (ibid 33).  See Molnar, Powers, p. 
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immediately apparent  in the passively observable flux of events in extra-experimental 
reality.  (In fact, this latter point was already present in embryonic form in the above 
argument for the first conclusion of Bhaskar’s analysis, since that argument contended 
that the regularity of experimental sequences must provide something that extra-
experimental reality to a large degree does not.)  As Chalmers says: “Observation of 
falling leaves will not yield Galileo’s law of fall”, for example, and so for the most part 
“it is necessary to practically intervene” with experiments to ascertain causal laws
52.  
This is why Bhaskar sympathizes with Marx’s claim that “all science would be 
superfluous if the form of appearance of things directly coincided with their 
essence”
53
Nevertheless, the key point here is that experimental results can be applicable to 
extra-experimental reality precisely because generative mechanisms are operable in 
both the former and the latter.  That is, knowledge of generative mechanisms 
obtained through the regular sequences of events exhibited in experiments can be 
used to make sense of the irregular sequences of events that result from the interaction 
of multiple generative mechanisms in extra-experimental reality
.   
54
At its [an experiment’s—DM] core is the notion that the conditions for the 
production of a given type of effect can be separated into factors which can be 
varied independently of one another, so as to reveal the way the factors behave 
in their natural, i.e. non-experimental, state.  The key assumption here is that 
the entities under study retain their identities (and dispositional powers), whether 
or not their circumambient conditions are held constant, as in the laboratory, or 
vary freely, as in extra-experimental reality. (SRHE 35) 
.  Bhaskar’s 
contention is that this is only possible if there are generative mechanisms that 
“endure” amidst various outcomes of their exercise and between, before, and/or after 
intervals of their exercise.  This is because that “endurance”—which is relative (at 
least) to the intervals between an instance of the exercise of a generative mechanism in 
experimental settings and a subsequent instance of that exercise in extra-experimental 
reality—ultimately provides the link between experiments and extra-experimental 
reality and conditions the relevance of the former to the latter: 
Thus it is because Galileo’s metallic spheres retain their disposition to fall with 
uniform velocity outside the experimental setup that we can know that their 
uninhibited behaviour on the inclined planes indicates a generative mechanism that is 
equally if not solely operative when the spheres fall from heights in less controlled 
                                                       
52 Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science?, p. 28.  Cf. ibid 28 and 216. 
53 Karl Marx, Capital, trans. David Fernbach, vol. 3, 3 vols., 1
st ed., London, Penguin, 1991, p. 956.  Cf. 
Bhaskar/Callinicos, “Marxism and Critical Realism”, p. B99. 
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settings with irregular results.  Hence whereas metaphysicians like Molnar advance 
metaphysical arguments for the existence of powers that are independent from their 
exercise
55
Moreover, if it is generative mechanisms that are at issue in the relation between 
experiments and extra-experimental reality, then we can also explain how scientists 
can initiate the sequences of events that constitute the empirical grounds for causal 
laws without producing the laws themselves.  The experimental initiation of a 
sequence of events can now be understood as the attempted activation of a generative 
mechanism in relative isolation from others and in the presence of its enabling 
conditions, so that the mechanism under consideration—not  the experimenter—
produces its characteristic effect and concludes the sequence of events
, Bhaskar’s advances the transcendental argument that experimental activity 
(and particularly extra-experimental application) can only be intelligible if there are 
causal powers/generative mechanisms that exist over and above their activity.   
56.  As Collier 
argues, an experimenter can force a generative mechanism to operate that was not 
operating before (or operating with impediments), but that is quite different from 
bringing them into existence out of nonexistence
57
Let us consider an example used by Bhaskar: an experiment designed to test 
Ohm’s law, which concerns the nature of an electrical current passed through a 
conductor (and specifically, its directly proportional relation to the electric potential 
and inversely proportional relation to the resistance between two points).  In this case 
the experimenter must on the one hand ensure that the enabling conditions of the 
relevant generative mechanism of the electric current (i.e., the characteristic way of 
acting of the current with which Ohm’s law is concerned) are satisfied and the 
mechanism itself activated.  So, an electric circuit must be wired and an electric 
current generated.  On the other hand, the experimenter must ensure that the 
generative mechanism produces its characteristic effect through the sequence of 
events s/he initiates.  So, the experimenter must guarantee that appropriate resistance 
.  If experimentation did the latter, 
we would be back to the problem posed in the argument for the second conclusion of 
Bhaskar’s analysis: experiments would have an ontogenetic function that nullifies their 
epistemic value.  Again, then, it is a condition of the intelligibility of experimental 
activity that generative mechanisms exist over and above their activity, for they must 
pre-exist their actualizations if experiments only activate generative mechanisms 
instead of bringing them into existence (and they must continue to so exist if 
experimental results can be applied to extra-experimental reality).   
                                                       
55 See Molnar, Powers, pp. 82-98. 
56 Cf. PN 171-2 and SRHE 35. 
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levels are maintained or that no extraneous magnetic field interferes with the working 
of the electrical circuit
58
Finally, however, if generative mechanisms provide the common basis for causal 
laws between experiments and extra-experimental reality, and experimental 
sequences provide the extra-experimentally applicable empirical grounds for causal 
laws, then an adequate conception of causal laws must countenance the difference 
between a generative mechanism’s activity in open and closed systems.  That is, if 
generative mechanisms operate unhindered in experiments but are often hindered in 
extra-experimental reality, then a causal law cannot be a law that stipulates what a 
generative mechanism always does, for in an open system, where irregularity often 
holds sway, it does not necessarily always do anything.  In other words, the 
intelligibility of experimental activity requires a conception of causal laws that does 
not entail their violation (or the falsification of theories that posit them) upon 
observation of extra-experimental reality
.  Therefore, even though the experimenter is responsible for 
initiating the ensuing sequence of events, for activating the generative mechanism, 
and (just because of that initiation and activation) for the occurrence of the generative 
mechanism’s characteristic effect in the experiment, s/he cannot be held responsible 
for the existence of Ohm’s law if (and only if) that law has its basis in a generative 
mechanism that is irreducible to its actualizations.   
59.  However, the opposite extreme must be 
avoided as well.  Causal laws must reflect some  constraint on the activity of a 
generative mechanism, for otherwise experimental sequences of events would be 
neither informative nor applicable.  That is, such sequences would be unable to tell us 
anything specific about generative mechanisms or the way they operate in extra-
experimental reality.  Consequently, Bhaskar contends, causal laws must consist in the 
tendencies of  generative mechanisms, thereby stipulating the effect(s) a generative 
mechanism tends to—but need not actually or always—produce
60.  Thus even though 
the actualization of a tendency may result in a sequence of events, it cannot be 
identified with or reduced to such sequences.  It exists over and above them, for it 
retains its identity amidst various outcomes of its activity—i.e., whether it is actualized 
or counteracted—and it can exist without such activity since it can be possessed 
unexercised
61
                                                       
58 Cf. RTS 53, 53n36, and 256. 
.  Thus if  causal laws are taken to be the tendencies of generative 
59 Cf.: “just as a rule can be broken without being changed, so a natural mechanism may continue to 
endure, and the law it grounds be both applicable and true (that is, not falsified), though its effect (i.e., the 
consequent) be unrealized” (PN 11) and Collier 35.  Also cf. the supplementary argument for the second 
conclusion of Bhaskar’s analysis above. 
60 Cf. RTS 50. 
61 Cf. Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science?, pp. 218-9 and Molnar, Powers, p. 199.   COSMOS AND HISTORY  221 
mechanisms, then the regularities of experiments and the irregularities of extra-
experimental reality can be reconciled and the applicability of the former to the latter 
maintained. 
Now, one might reasonably ask what has become of the transcendentally real 
character of causal laws, which was included in the third conclusion of Bhaskar’s 
analysis above.  However, this has already been established by the foregoing 
arguments, if only implicitly.  For a start, if causal laws, as the tendencies of generative 
mechanisms, are independent from the actualizations of tendencies (in the sense that 
tendencies can be possessed unexercised and exercised unfulfilled, so that causal laws 
can exist as such in either case), then they must be independent from perception as 
well.  This is because anything that can be perceived is the result of the exercise of 
tendencies—i.e., sequences of events and states of things.  In other words, we may 
perceive particular actualizations of causal laws, but we do not perceive the laws 
themselves; we may perceive the effects of a generative mechanism’s tendential 
behaviour, its manifestation, but we do not perceive the tendencies themselves.  To 
test this claim, and recalling that tendencies are irreducible to their actualizations, just 
try to envision a situation in which we directly perceive a tendency itself rather than its 
effects.  What does it look like?  What is its size, shape, colour, texture, sound, taste, or 
smell?  We can easily answer these questions with the effects of a tendency’s exercise, 
and such effects can indirectly indicate the existence of the tendency, but we do not 
perceive the tendency itself.   
Indeed, this imperceptibility of tendencies is precisely what informs a fundamental 
tenet of regularity theories and their various treatments of the problem of natural 
necessity.  For regularity theorists, it is because causal powers are never directly given 
in perception that natural necessity has to be derived psychologically a la Hume or 
conceptually a la Kant.  A typical (and canonical) regularity theorist argument of this 
kind can be found in one of Hume’s arguments against the legitimate application of 
the concept of causal power on the basis of the absence of any corresponding sensible 
impression: 
In reality, there is no part of matter, that does ever, by its sensible qualities, 
discover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it could 
produce any thing, or be followed by any other object, which we could 
denominate its effect.  Solidity, extension, motion; these qualities are all 
complete in themselves, and never point out any other event which may result 
from them.  The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object 
follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power or force, which 
actuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers 
itself in any of the sensible qualities of body.  We know that, in fact, heat is a   DUSTIN McWHERTER  222 
constant attendant of flame; but what is the connection between them, we have 
no room so much as to conjecture or imagine.  It is impossible, therefore, that 
the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies, in single 
instances of their operation; because no bodies ever discover any power, which 
can be the original of this idea.
62
By the same token, if the tendency of a generative mechanism is something that 
can be exercised without actualizing its effect, then in such cases a generative 
mechanism’s activity, not just its existence, is independent from perception as well since 
it is active without generating anything that can be perceived (i.e., its effects).  
Furthermore, insofar as generative mechanisms are real ontological powers to 
generate effects and are discovered a posteriori, they cannot be conflated with our 
concepts of them
 
63.  Lastly, and perhaps most clearly by now, the independence of 
causal laws from the practical and material conditions that enable us to identify 
them—which independence consists in their prevalence in extra-experimental 
reality—is required for the intelligibility of those very conditions
64
In short, transcendentally real tendencies of generative mechanisms can be 
determined to exist by philosophical argument insofar they condition the intelligibility 
of experimental activity.  They are independent from our practical and material 
activity since they must exist whether we intervene in the course of natural events with 
experiments or not; they are independent from the concepts and theories we have of 
them since they must be discovered a posteriori; and they are independent from 
perception because they themselves have no perceptible qualities (though they can 
generate such qualities).  Therefore, establishing that causal laws are the tendencies of 
.   
                                                       
62 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3
rd ed., New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 50.  Cf.: “Hume had argued ad nauseam that the presence in an 
object of an unmanifesting power couldn’t be established by sense perception alone.  Testing for the 
presence of the power normally involves triggering a manifestation from the occurrence of which the 
existence of the power is then inferred.  Powers are not among the perceptible properties, they are occult 
by their very nature.  Only the qualitative, non-dispositional properties are knowable directly, that is, by 
sense perception alone.  Powers are not manifest but are knowable only inferentially, if they are 
knowable at all” (Molnar, Powers, p. 167).  (Also cf. ibid 135-6.)  I assume this claim that the existence of 
powers can only be inferred applies mainly to cases where the existence of some particular power is at 
issue.  Again, however, note that if Bhaskar’s analysis holds up, then we have a transcendental argument 
for the general existence of powers—i.e., in abstraction from cases or scientific theories regarding 
particular powers.  Needless to say, it is this argument that is intended to counter Hume’s critique. 
63 Cf.:“Only because nature is an open system are experiments necessary.  But since they are also possible, 
mechanisms must be real and distinct, not just schemes imposed by us on a ‘buzzing and booming 
confusion’; for the mechanisms (or some of them) can be isolated in experimentally established closed 
systems” (Collier 46). 
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generative mechanisms in the way Bhaskar does simultaneously establishes their 
transcendentally real character.  Thus Bhaskar can claim: 
These mechanisms (...) endure and act quite independently of men.  The 
statements that describe their operations (...) are  not statements about 
experiences (empirical statements, properly so called) or statements about 
events.  Rather they are statements about the ways things act in the world (that 
is, about the forms of activity of the things of the world) and would act in a 
world without men, where there would be no experiences and few, if any, 
constant conjunctions of events. (RTS 17)
65
§4. CONCLUSION 
 
Only if causal laws are the transcendentally real tendencies of generative mechanisms 
can we explain how the experimental initiation of regular sequences of events is 
epistemically necessary (since it gives us empirical access to the characteristic effects of 
the operation of a generative mechanism, and thus indirect access to the generative 
mechanism itself) and extra-experimentally applicable to an open system (since the 
same generative mechanisms we individually identify in experiments are also active in 
extra-experimental reality alongside others that may frustrate their activity).  
Moreover, causal laws being tendencies can explain how the natural world can be 
lawful yet (at level of sequences of events) irregular: “once it is appreciated that events, 
though caused (...), are very rarely conjoined, it can be seen why order in the world must 
be pitched at a level categorically distinct from events” (RTS 144, emphasis added).  This 
positive conclusion is the culmination of the transcendental analysis of experimental 
activity.  If that analysis is sound, the regularity theorist accepts its presuppositions, 
and we are to maintain the intelligibility of experimental activity, then there simply 
remains no more room for regularity theories of causal laws, for such theories reduce 
causal laws to their actualizations in perception: 
Patently, if it is the case that our causal activity is necessary for the realisation of 
the consequents of laws, they just cannot be glossed, without absurdity, as 
empirical regularities.  That is, if it is not the case that whenever a then b then in 
making a claim about a causal law, we cannot, if we are to sustain the 
                                                       
65 See ibid 251-2 where Bhaskar clarifies the ambiguity of the term “law” and claims that, were he to 
rewrite RTS, he would use this term only to denote the operations of a generative mechanism as opposed 
to statements describing the operations of a generative mechanism, whereas in RTS he uses the term in both 
senses.  I have always used the term in the former sense and have interpreted the passages I cite from 
Bhaskar and other authors to be doing the same, although I have edited out an instance of the latter 
sense in the passage from ibid 17 above for the sake of terminological simplicity.   DUSTIN McWHERTER  224 
intelligibility of the experimental establishment and transfactual
66
Furthermore, such regularity theories of causal laws take a constant conjunction of 
events to be at least a necessary (and sometimes sufficient) condition for a causal law.  
However, if Bhaskar’s analysis is valid, then a constant conjunction is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for a causal law, for a tendency can exist and 
operate without any constant conjunctions of events arising
 application of 
our knowledge, be making a claim about a sequence of events.  Instead we must 
be construed as making a claim about something that bears only a contingent 
relationship to the actual world (including that significant subset of it produced 
by human work).  This claim, I have argued, is about the operation of a 
tendency of the working of a mechanism irrespective of its actualisation in any 
particular outcome.  And if that is the case, then all the theories based on the 
flawed principle of empirical-invariance—from the consistency condition of 
monistic historiography of science to Feyerabend’s ‘dadaism’, from the Popper-
Hempel theory of explanation to standard (empirical realist) analyses of 
counterfactuals (...), from the 2
nd Analogy to Bachelard’s cogitamus—must all be 
radically wrong. (ibid 256-7) 
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To summarize the transcendental analysis of experimental activity, let me 
succinctly reiterate the conclusions in the logical form appropriate to transcendental 
argumentation to underscore the analysis’s overall argument.  As Bhaskar explains, a 
transcendental argument has the following syllogistic form: 
.   
 
Major premise: Only if Q, then P 
Minor premise: P 
Conclusion: Q 
 
However, unlike other forms of philosophical argumentation, “the interest of a 
transcendental argument clearly does not lie in the formal derivation of the 
conclusion, which is trivial; but in the production of the knowledge of the major 
premiss (i.e. in the analysis)” (RTS 257).  More specifically, the real work consists in 
establishing the antecedent to the major premise (Q) so it can be derived as the 
conclusion, for the consequent/minor premise (P) is supposed to be somewhat 
uncontroversial.  In Bhaskar’s case, the intelligibility of experimental activity stands in 
for  P, and each of the three conclusions discussed above alternately stand for Q.  
Therefore, we could summarize the results of this essay as: 
 
                                                       
66 I.e., including but exceeding actual events. 
67 Cf. RTS 33 and 164, PN 9-10, and RR 16.   COSMOS AND HISTORY  225 
Major premise(s): Only if extra-experimental reality is an open system (Q1), causal 
laws are not constant conjunctions of events (Q2), and causal laws are the 
transcendentally real tendencies of generative mechanisms (Q3), then experimental 
activity is intelligible (P) 
Minor premise: Experimental activity is intelligible (P) 
Conclusion(s): Extra-experimental reality is an open system (Q1), causal laws are 
not constant conjunctions of events (Q2), and causal laws are the transcendentally real 
tendencies of generative mechanisms (Q3) 
 
With this critique of regularity theories of causal laws and case for a realist 
ontology of causal powers Bhaskar deals a serious blow to  the anti-metaphysical 
agenda of logical positivism (and much subsequent philosophy of science).  For the 
transcendental analysis of experimental activity shows that the idea that metaphysics 
must be eradicated from philosophical accounts of natural science is itself inconsistent 
with the epistemic significance of one of natural science’s most central features.  
Consequently, the reaction against the “speculative excesses” of nineteenth-century 
Naturphilosophie which motivated much anti-metaphysical philosophy of science may 
have severely overestimated the rationality of the decision to avoid metaphysics 
altogether.  Indeed, Bhaskar places the ontology of causal powers discussed here 
within a broader philosophical framework whose ontological naturalism and 
metaphysical boldness might make it appropriate to be deemed a contemporary 
“philosophy of nature”.  Just within RTS, the picture of nature as consisting of 
multiple interacting generative mechanisms is expanded with the notions of 
stratification—reflecting the layered levels of generative mechanisms in nature (e.g., 
physical, chemical, biological, psychological, social)—and  emergence—reflecting the 
status of many natural strata as dependent upon yet irreducible to more fundamental 
strata.  Furthermore, these aspects of Bhaskar’s philosophy of natural science are 
complemented with accounts of social mechanisms and the causality of intentional 
agency in works like PN and SRHE.  And in Bhaskar’s more systematically and 
ontologically ambitious later works, like Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom, these earlier 
conceptions of natural and social causality are developed and dialectically related as 
modes of “absenting”, connected by “rhythmic” spatiotemporal actualization and 
“holistic” intra-relational mediation
68
                                                       
68 Cf. Roy Bhaskar, Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom, first published by Verso (1993), Abingdon, Routledge, 
2008, p. 240. 
.  A critical reappraisal of these further elements 
of Bhaskar’s philosophy with a view towards their potential value for contemporary   DUSTIN McWHERTER  226 
metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science may be an endeavour well 
worth pursuing.   
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